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Marine species are reproducible resource. Maintaining the stock level of marine 
species and the sustainability of fisheries development become critical issues in 
current scientific research areas due to the explosion of human population and 
exacerbation of natural environment. The traditional method that protects the marine 
species is the single species approach which set maximum sustainable yield (MSY) to 
prevent over-harvest. However, with the development of technology and 
comprehension of marine science, the single species approach has been found 
obsolete and incapable of dealing with problems of severe depletion of fish stocks and 
escalation of fisheries confliction. Studies show that when regulations are species 
specific and species are part of a multi-species fisheries, the catch levels of different 
species are correlated which result in correlation of net return from each species. 
This paper employ financial portfolio into fisheries, treat fish stocks as assets, model 
the fishers’ behaviour who face multiple targeting options to predict the optimal 
targeting strategies. This methodology is applied to New Zealand fisheries that are 
managed in Quota Management System (QMS) introduced in 1986. Species 
considered in this research are selected carefully based on two criteria. Efficient risk-
return frontier will be generated that provides a combination of optimal strategies. 
Comparison between results and actual data will be presented. Potential explanations 











Two-thirds of the surface of the Earth is covered by ocean and inland water. Marine 
systems have provided food and other natural resources for humans for thousands of 
years. Fish are a source of food; oil and other sources of energy are vital to modern 
society.  However, with the development of technology and population explosion, 
human activities have inevitably created tremendous impacts on the marine ecosystem 
and these activities have jeopardized the sustainable use of oceans. Unfortunately, this 
problem was not fully recognised and clearly understood until the over-harvesting 
problem had endangered the survival of many marine species. Recently, many 
scientists and economists have acknowledged that institutional interventions should 
be made to manage human activities and protect the marine resource so that the 
services they provide can be sustained for future generations.  
 
The conventional method aimed at preventing the over-harvesting of fish is the single 
species approach. Under this approach, harvest limits and species biomass are 
estimated using a biological model. Economic profitability is not integrated into the 
decision making process as seen by the use of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) to 
limit the catch level. A large number of papers have extended this single species 
approach by incorporating further instruments, such as right-based management 
system, and so on.  
 
Recently, the single species approach has been found to be an inadequate guide for 
setting harvest levels while maintaining ecosystem health. The main reason for this 
criticism is that marine systems change as a result of a combination of human 
activities and environmental variation. Marine species should be considered as a 
complex rather than a collection of species in isolation. As a result, it is argued that 
ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) should be used because it recognises 
the correlation among multi-species. Ecosystem-based fisheries management is a 
novel integrated approach that provides a framework for understanding and managing 
human activities that affect the marine system. The overall goal of EBFM is to restore  
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and maintain an ecosystem in a healthy, productive and resilient
1 condition; integrate 
species and human activities so as to provide sustainable ecosystem services to 
humans. Although there is a consensus about the validity and necessity of EBFM, 
there is little literature on how to operationalize it. Implementing EBFM requires both 
market information and biological science.  
 
My research proposal is based on the thesis that financial portfolio theory can be 
applied to EBFM so as to investigate both species interaction and profitability. 
Portfolio theory can incorporate the inter-dependence among different species, 
consider risks that result from the uncertainty of profits and provide an optimal 
strategy for marine species. Implementing the portfolio approach requires not only 
economic and ecological knowledge, but also administration rules such as those 
embodied in New Zealand’s quota management system (QMS).  
 
New Zealand’s QMS was introduced in 1986. Under this rights-based system, 
individual firms hold a share of harvest quota which is set by Ministry of Fisheries at 
the beginning of each fishing season. Since 1986, the Ministry has relied exclusively 
on biological models and the stock assessment process for setting the allowable 
harvest.  This approach does not provide adequate information on the economic 
impact of adjusting the allowable harvest.  
 
My research employs financial portfolio theory to determine the most appropriate 
harvest level for fishing firms governed by the QMS. In principle, under the QMS, 
each fishing firm cannot harvest an amount over its quota endowment. The first model 
in this research investigates the optimal harvest under this binding constraint. 
However, the introduction of the annual catch entitlement (ACE) and deemed value 
regime into the QMS in 2001 enables fishing firms to harvest in excess of their rights. 
The second model examines the optimal harvest when this constraint is absent. Each 
model will determine the optimal harvest portfolio given market conditions. The 
portfolio approach will also generate an efficient frontier which consists of a 
combination of optimal strategies based on firm manager’s risk tolerance.  
 
                                                 
1 Resilience is a measure of the ability of systems to absorb changes and persist.   
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2. Background Information 
 
2.1. Single species approach 
 
The predominant approach used to manage fish stocks is to treat species 
independently. Exploited species are regarded in isolation from their surrounding 
environment. Marine habitat, predators and prey of the target species, and interactions 
with other components in ecosystem are ignored.  
 
 
2.1.1. Schaefer Model 
 
The most commonly used model in single species analysis is the Schaefer model after 
biologist M.B. Schaefer (1957). Before this model can be applied, it is necessary to 
estimate the logistic growth function of the marine species.  
 
Let x = x(t) denote the population size of fish species at time t. Suppose that both the 
birth rate b and mortality rate m are proportional to population size.  We write n = b – 
m as for the net proportional growth rate, and obtain the continuous-time stock 
dependent growth model 
 
                                   
dt
dx
= G(x) – h(t) = bx – mx = n · x,                                    (1.1) 
 
where G(x) represents the natural growth rate of the population, and h(t) represents 
the rate of removal or harvesting. 
 
This simplified model implies that when G(x)≡h(t), the population x remains at a 
constant level. In other word, the natural growth rate G(x) provides a sustainable yield 
that can be removed from the marine system without varying the population level x.  
 
Under ideal conditions with a relative small population size, the forces of maturation 
and reproduction are supposed to dominate. With abundant food and living space,  
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individuals breed fast. However, this trend cannot continue infinitely. As the 
population level becomes larger, food and space scarcities start to decrease the growth 
rate. At some point there will be a natural equilibrium between these positive and 
negative factors of growth and a natural population size would be formed. The 
simplest model that can be used to illustrate this effect would be  
 
                                                  n(x) = n(1 – x/K)                
                                   
so that   
                                               
dt
dx








1 x.                                      (1.2) 
 
This is the logistic equation, proposed firstly by P.F. Verhulst in 1838. The positive 
constant n is usually called the intrinsic growth rate which refers to the proportional 
growth rate for small population size; K is the environmental carrying capacity which 
is assumed to be positive and constant. This model indicates that the proportional 
growth rate n(x) is a decreasing function of x, specifically,  
 
                                                     n(x) = 
x
x G ) (
.                                                   (1.3) 
 





  Growth Rate 
                       
            
                                                                                             G(x)        
                                                                                     
                
 
                                                                                                                 Population x 
                               Figure 1. The Logistic Growth Function  
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In fisheries statistics, fishing effort is often used to measure the total number of 
vessel-days per unit time. With the introduction of fishing effort E, an assumption is 
made that catch-per-unit-effort is proportional to biomass level: 
 
                                                        h = aEx,                                                        (1.4) 
 
where a is called the catchability coefficient, E denotes the fishing effort.  
 
Substituting both (1.3) and (1.4) into Eq. (1.1), the harvesting model will be  
 
                          
dt
dx








1 x – aEx.                (1.5) 
 
In equilibrium, dx/dt = 0. Solving this equation, we have a unique nonzero 
equilibrium x, given by  










Plugging x* into the harvest equation we obtain, the equilibrium harvest sustainable 
yield  








.                                  (1.6) 
 
The parabola in Figure 2 illustrates this equation. 
        Growth of x                                                            
                                                                                                         aEx 
                                                    G(x) 
              h* 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                            
 
                                                                                              x*                                    x 
                        Figure 2. Logistic Model with Constant Fishing Effort E.  
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Harvest, as represented by equation (1.6), is a quadratic function of fishing effort E. 
Sustainable yield increases firstly as fishing effort increases; then after a critical point, 
sustainable yield starts decreases as E increases. Solving this equation, we obtain the 
critical point x* = K/2, E = n/2a.  
 
MSY is determined when fishing effort E = n/2a. If the fishing effort reaches E = n/a, 
population size shrinks to zero, the species is extinguished. Figure 3 presents the 
yield-effort curve which emphasizes the yield corresponding to different levels of 
fishing effort E. This is a more useful illustration because E can be considered a 
choice variable of fisheries management.  
 
                  Yield Y 
 
         
       MSY 





                                   
                                                          
                                                                  n/2a                                          n/a               E 
                           Figure 3. Yield-effort Curve for the Schaefer Model 
 
The model derived above does not incorporate any economic factors. In order to 
develop an economic model, it is necessary to determine the market price for both 
fishing effort and harvested species. Let us assume that the harvested fish are sold on 
a market with a constant and given price. We also assume that each unit of effort has a 
constant and given opportunity cost. This cost represents the market value of unit 
effort. These assumptions enable us to build the revenue and cost function depicted in 
Figure 4.  
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                                       Figure 4. Simple Bio-economic Model  
 
The effort yield curve in Figure 3 multiplied by the unit price of the harvested fish 
gives us the total revenue curve in Figure 4. Thus the inverted U-shape is preserved. 
The straight line represents total cost. It starts at the origin and rising to the right with 
a slope representing the opportunity cost of a unit of effort. In this simple model the 
net income refers to the net social benefit corresponding to any effort level. In Figure 
4, this is depicted by the distance between total revenue curve and total cost line. This 
distance is maximised at effort level of e* because at this level the slope of total cost 
is equal to the slope of total revenue, which means that marginal revenue equals to 
marginal cost at this effort level, and net benefits at this point are equal to (r1 – r2). It 
is easy to see that at any other effort level, net benefits-the distance between the two 
curves-would be smaller than at e*.  
 
 
2.1.2. The Inadequacy of Single Species Approach 
 
Biologically, the single species MSY approach mentioned above does not 
accommodate interactions among species that comprise aquatic communities. 
Economically, MSY fails to account for profitability. Furthermore, MSY-led policies  
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ignore the problem of what is the appropriate mix of species and population size in an 
ecosystem; how to address the difficulty of the existence of uncertainty affecting 
species contributions; and how to operationalize the ecosystem management approach 
with suitable policies. Since traditional models do not account for the ecosystem 
dynamics of species interactions, fish stocks cannot be managed effectively (Robert 
1997, Bax 1998, Arnason 2000, Caddy and Cochrane 2001, Manickchand-Heileman 
et al. 2004).  
 
Bycatch – where non-target fish are caught incidentally – also challenges the 
feasibility of single species approach. According to Gislason et al. (2003), bycatch 
can change the trophic
2 structure of the entire ecosystem. For example, more than 
80% of the annual mortality of white marlin resulted from the harvest of swordfish 
and tuna by U.S. longline fisheries (Foundation file, 2001). This resulted in white 
marlin being listed as an endangered species by the U.S. government. The nature of 
the marine system and the inherent non-selectivity of fish gear imply that the single 
species approach is not consistent with ecological principles and not profitable from 
the perspective of fisheries management.  
 
Many prominent biologists, economists, and mathematicians have objected to the use 
of the single species approach based on MSY in fisheries management. According to 
May et al. (1979), isolated consideration of MSY cannot provide sufficient 
information for management, although it is a useful point for the discussion of single 
species management. The MSY concept by its self, is not sophisticated enough to 
“serve as a valid operational objective for the management of most living resource 
stocks” (Clark, 1990). Arnason (1998), in one of his articles dealing with transferable 
quota, indicated that single species approach may result in serious mistakes in the 
interpretation of the observed data, and subsequently forecasting and policy 
recommendations. Larkin (1977) even wrote a poem to ridicule the institutionalized 
policy of single species in many countries and spoke of a “farewell” to MSY.  
 
 
                                                 
2 The word “trophic” refers to feeding. “Trophic level” describes the feeding level in a food web. The 
first trophic level includes species known as the primary producers, e.g. photosynthesizers.  
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2.2.  Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management 
 
Ecosystems are complex natural units that provide a flow of services to commercial 
fisheries. Fishing has a direct influence on ecosystems; on the other hand, ecosystems 
influence commercial fishing. Therefore, it is necessary to manage fisheries as an 
ecosystem. ESBM is a holistic approach to maintain ecosystem
3 quality and sustain 
associated benefits (Larkin, 1996; Ecosystems Principles Advisory Panel, 1999; 
Brodziak and Link, 2002). Specifically, EBFM can be defined as “an approach that 
takes major ecosystem components and services – both structural and functional – 
into account in managing fisheries… its goal is to rebuild and sustain populations, 
species, biological communities and marine ecosystems at high levels of productivity 
and biological diversity so as not to jeopardize a wide range of goods and services 
from marine ecosystems while providing food, revenues and recreation for humans” 
(US National Research Council, 1998).  
 
Generally, there are three dynamic ecosystem issues to consider: trophic linkages, 
bycatch, and multispecies substitution. The relationship between predator and prey 
species is commonly positive. If the landings of a predator species increase, then the 
prey species population will increase as well. Consequently the harvest of prey 
species will increase because its predator is undergoing bigger removal. Given that 
the life cycle of these two species is different, it would be expected that this negative 
effect will take place with a lag. For example, in a research for the relationship 
between Carite
4 (predator) and honey-shrimp (prey) in the Gulf of Paria (Dhoray & 
Teelucksingh, 2007), Trinidad, the most appropriate lag length was found to be two 
years in this system.  
 
The relationship between target and bycatch species is negative. If there is an increase 
in the target species landings, then the landings of bycatch species will fall because 
the increased mortality rate will result in a reduction in the harvestable amount of 
bycatch species. Multispecies substitution effects occur when two valuable species 
can be caught by same harvesting methods. If two different species are harvested by 
                                                 
3 An ecosystem is a dynamic complex of microbes, plants, animal and physical environmental 
substances that interact with each other. 
4 Carite is the local name for the Spanish mackerel Scomberomorous brasailiensis.   
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the same technique, e.g. gillnet, then the proportion of species with greater 
commercial value will exceed the less valuable species because additional fishing 
effort will be allocated deliberately to more valuable species. This implies that there is 
a negative relationship between these two species because every harvesting method 
has limited capacity. An increase in the landings of more valuable species will 
decrease the landings of less valuable species. Previous research indicates that both 
the bycatch effect and substitute effect occur with periodic lags and the duration of 
this lag will depend on the species and their living environments.  
 
Decision making based on EBFM differs from single species management. Single 
species management aims at not harvesting more than the growth of the target specie; 
In contrast, EBFM aims to ensure that the total biomass removed in all fisheries does 
not exceed the ecosystem productivity, after considering other components of the 
same marine community, e.g. correlation between target and bycatch species, trophic 
interactions among predator and prey species, and habitat variance.  
 
Recently, the importance of uncertainty has been recognised in fisheries management. 
Traditional single species management models compare the advantages and 
disadvantages between an open access fishery and revenue maximizing fishery. 
However, there are certain unpredictable fluctuations that cause uncertainty in 
commercial fisheries. Fluctuations in market prices can have a major impact on profit. 
The price of fuel, the major input of fishing, also varies over time. Another problem in 
fisheries management is the identification of cause and effect in an ecosystem 
(Gislason et al. 2000). Human activities, distance and afar, and natural community 
variability can change the ecosystem structure and function. These factors result in 
uncertainty when analysing harvesting strategies. Government policy can also create 
risky returns. Currently, management rules are based on a single-species approach. 
Regulations that treat each species separately are implausible because these species 
interact with others in the ecosystem. Other rules, such as catch limits create 
incentives for fishers to discard their harvest; area-closure rules can work to decrease 
profits and increase variability of profits.  
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After the evaluation of potential consequences, regulators and management agencies 
can take actions under the suggested policies. Several tools can be taken to manage a 
fishery where risk is present (Hilborn et al. 2001):  
      
      (1)  Technical methods, e.g. gear type, engine horsepower, mesh size, fishing 
areas and seasons closures, e.g. Marine Protected Area (MPA), etc. 
      (2)   Input controls, e.g. number, type and size of vessels, restrictions on days-at-
sea, etc. 
      (3)  Output  controls,  e.g.  harvest control, transferability of individual and 
community quota, bycatch limits, etc. 
 
These controls are not used in isolation. Instead, they are normally applied 
simultaneously. The simplest form of risk management is risk sharing. Insurance is an 
example in which risk of loss is shared with insurance purchaser. Another option for 
risk sharing is the diversification mechanism of a portfolio approach that has been 
extensively used in financial markets.  
 
Risk in the fishery can be assessed and reduced, but cannot be avoided. If we want to 
maintain the stability of the fishing community, we have to understand that it is 
important to manage risk even though we have seen little evidence of the 
implementation of risk management in current fishery policies. In addition, we should 
realize that current ecological theories have limited explanatory power; further 
research is necessary to address the problem of uncertainty and provide scientific 
advice on fisheries management.  
 
 
2.3. Portfolio Approach 
 
Financial portfolio theory provides a framework for dealing with species interactions 
in fisheries management and addresses the problem of uncertainty. The portfolio 
approach is based on the portfolio theory developed by Nobel-Prize winner Herry  
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Markowitz (1952)
5 . Markowitz’s portfolio analysis is a mathematical tool to 
determine how to select the optimum proportion of assets in a portfolio for investment. 
This technique has been extensively used in financial markets. Applying portfolio 
theory to fisheries management and policy is a recent development. 
 
 
2.3.1. Portfolio Tools. 
 
A portfolio is a combination of investments that achieves the highest possible 
expected return given a level of risk (Grinblatt and Titman, 2001).  This theory is 
based on the assumption that investors are mean-variance optimizers. Portfolio 
holders are assumed to be risk-averse; they prefer lowest possible return variance of 
an investment return. Thus asset allocation is very beneficial to portfolio managers 
who want to decide how much of their portfolio should be assigned for each 
investment including stocks, real estate, equities, etc. To lessen risk, portfolio 
managers should hold many securities to balance their investment by diversification 
among different securities. When a portfolio manager adds more stocks in portfolio, 
the additional stocks diversify the portfolio if these stocks do not move together (co-
very) with the existing stocks in the portfolio.  
 
There are three characteristics of each security that determine the mean and variance 
of return of a portfolio: 
 
1.  The mean return (expected return) of each security. 
2.  The variance of the return of each security. 
3.  The covariance between the return of each security and the returns of other 
securities in the portfolio. 
 
The expected return is calculated by multiplying the return outcomes with the 
probability of the outcome and sum up all the weighted outcomes. For a portfolio 
which consists with N stocks, the portfolio return is: 
                                                 
5  His analysis was originally presented in a paper: “Portfolio Selection”, Journal of Finance, March 
1952, pp. 77 – 91. Later Markowitz extended and elaborated his research and published it in a book, 
Portfolio Selection, Cowles Foundation Monograph 16 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc,m 1959).  
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                                R
~
p = x1r ~
1 + x2r ~










i is the return of individual stock i, and xi is the corresponding proportion of 
stock i.  
 
The variance of a return is the expected value of squared return net of expected return: 
 
                                      var(r ~ ) = E [(r ~  − r )
2] = σ(r ~ )
2, 
 
where r ~ is the return of the investment; r is the expected return of the investment and 
it is constant; σ(r ~ ) is the standard deviation of return r ~ .  
 
Covariance is a measure of relatedness of different investments. The general formula 
to calculate the covariance between two returns is: 
 
                                        σ12 = E[(r ~
1 − r 1) (r ~
1 − r 1)] .  
 
Given the information described above, it is possible to calculate the variance of the 
return of a portfolio. Specifically, the variance formula of a portfolio which consists 
of N stocks is: 







ij j ix x
11
σ ,  
 
where σij is the covariance between the returns of stocks i and j.  
 
Independent assets have zero covariance (Markowitz, 1959). If the returns of assets 
move together, then these assets are positively correlated with positive covariance. 
In this situation, combing these assets – for example, fishing technology and ecology 
– can increase expected aggregated returns. But it may not reduce risk. Instead, 
positive covariances will raise the portfolio variance. In contrast, asset returns that 
move in opposite directions are negatively correlated and have negative covariance. 
Portfolio variance will be reduced with the combination of negatively correlated  
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individual assets. Portfolio variance will be less than the sum of variance of individual 
assets. 
 
By plotting all feasible combination of assets in two-dimensional space with mean 
return on the vertical axis and standard deviation on the horizontal axis, we have the 
feasible set of portfolios. Figure 5 illustrates the feasible set in a return-variance 
quadrant. In this figure, the upper-left or “northwest’ boundary of this feasible set is 
known as mean-variance efficient frontier. This frontier is the most efficient trade-
off between the mean and variance. Given the fixed level of variance, combination of 
assets on the efficient frontier gives the maximized expected return. Similarly, given 
the fixed level of expected return, portfolios on the efficient frontier minimize 
variance. Portfolios that offer smaller expected return for the same variance are 
dropped from consideration.  
 
        
 Mean Return 
                                  Efficient Frontier for  
                                   Risky Stocks                    •Stock 1 
                                               
                                                •Stock 2 
 
                                                                                 •Stock 3                      Standard 
                                                                                                                     deviation 
                                                                                                                     of return  
                                           




2.3.2. Portfolio Analysis in Multi-Species Management.  
 
Portfolio analysis can be applied to either financial securities or real assets to find the 
most profitable combination of stocks given their individual return and risk properties. 
Naturally, fish species co-exist in ecosystem, and are most often caught by 
unspecialized gear. Harvesting one species can therefore affect the stock of other 
species. Portfolio theory systematically evaluates all feasible combinations of species 
which are joined by harvesting technology and ecology to find the optimal set that  
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generates the highest aggregate return for a given level of risk. When harvesting 
revenues are correlated among species, portfolio theory is suitable in multi-species 
fisheries that exhibit joint productive characteristics. 
 
However, the portfolio approach does not completely replace the single species 
approach outlined above. Instead, it complements existing models. Portfolio theory 
explicitly recognizes that fish species are risk-bearing capital assets that can yield 
long term revenues to fisheries. By changing fishing effort, it is possible to 
manipulate the population and diversification of fish stocks to desired levels and 
improve the aggregate return from exploitation of a fish community.  
 
There are two complementary parts that contribute to the implementation of portfolio 
theory to the multi-species fisheries management (Edwards et al. 2004). The first part 
systematically evaluates the trade-off between fishery benefits and risks resulting 
from environmental, market, and institutional uncertainties. Under this framework, 
fish stocks are treated as real assets that can provide economic benefit indefinitely. 
The contribution of a fish species and its collateral effects on other species is 
evaluated as an aggregate return to society. The second part comprises the property 
right institutions that create entry rules and assign harvesting rights (quota) to fishers 
in order to sustain the viability of fisheries.  
 
 
2.4. The Quota Management System 
 
New Zealand is a pioneer in the world for using individual transferable quota (ITQ) in 
fisheries management. Although many countries have implemented ITQs, no other 
country uses this system to the same extend as New Zealand does.  The quota 
management system (QMS) was introduced in 1986 to manage commercial species in 
New Zealand marine system. The setting of QMS is based on ITQ rights operating 
within an administered total allowable catch (TAC). The objective of employing QMS 
is to enhance profitability and to ensure that New Zealand’s fish resources are 
sustainably utilised through direct control of harvest levels. The QMS is widely 
regarded as one of the leading fish management tools in the world.   
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At the beginning of each fishing season, the Ministry of Fisheries states what quantity 
of each quota species can be caught. Decisions are based on stock assessment 
information supplied by the Ministry of Fisheries and on consultation with interested 
groups such as the commercial fishing industry, recreational fishers, Maori and other 
conservation groups. Allowable harvest levels are worked out using the concept of 
MSY illustrated in Figure 3, which is the largest average annual catch level that can 
be harvested without reducing the stock’s productive potential. Legislation requires 
administrators to manage stock levels toward MSY, adjusted by social and economic 
considerations. Records of annual landings, estimates of catch per unit effort, 
estimates of recreational harvest are made available to the stock assessment 
consultative process.  
 
The TAC includes the total harvest from commercial sector, recreational and 
customary fishing. Under the Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 S10 and Fisheries Act 
1996 Ss20, when allocating catch levels, the Minister must firstly make an allowance 
for customary catch. Once the customary allowance is determined, the remainder of 
the TAC is then allocated between commercial sector and recreational sector. Under 
current policy, neither of the two sectors has priority in legislation; both sectors have 
to be considered simultaneously.  
 
A total allowable commercial catch (TACC) is set after making an allowance for 
recreational fishing and customary harvest, which we define as the total allowable 
non-commercial catch (TANC). The TACC is a limit on the catch that can be taken by 
the commercial sector only. Thus the TAC = TACC + TANC. The TAC covers all 
mortality to a fish stock caused by human activity. Once the TACC is set for the year, 
fishing rights are distributed to quota owners in proportion to their quota holdings. 
Thus, individual firms hold an entitlement to harvest a share of the TACC defined as a 
percentage of the TACC
6. Quota holdings are standardised to one hundred million 
shares per fish stock.  
 
In 2001, Annual Catch Entitlements (ACE) were introduced into QMS. ACE rights 
are assigned to quota holders based on the share of total quota they hold and the 
                                                 
6 Under the Fisheries Amendment Act 1990 S15.  
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TACC. Given the TACC in a specific year, the kilogram equivalent of each quota 
share is calculated. This quota share, which is defined as ACE, is allocated to quota 
holder on the first day of fishing year. Therefore, the ACE determines the total 
tonnage of species that the quota holder can harvest within the fishing season. The 
introduction of ACE has distinct benefits because it separates the harvest rights 
between the current rights and long-term owners. Quota owners can sell their current 
harvesting entitlement (ACE) while retaining long-term ownership. Individual fishers 
can purchase ACE for a particular fishing season without a change of quota 
ownership.  
 
Because ITQ are transferable, they will, in principle, be owned by more efficient 
firms. Rights are defined in perpetuity, divisible, transferable, and bankable. Under 
the QMS, individuals who hold quota rights are free to sell as they wish. There is no 
pre-approval required for the trade. Also there is no limit on the number of times that 
the quota can be sold. Quota is divisible so that owners can sell parts of quota they 
hold. Before a buyer can use the quota, the trade must be registered. Not all quota 
holders wish to sell or fish their quota; instead, many of quota owners sell their ACE 
allowing others to fish their quota allocation in the current fishing period. By selling 
their ACE, quota owners are able to gain income from their quota rights. Quota rights 
cannot be owned by foreign companies. Moreover, there is a limitation on the 
quantity of quota holdings. Under the 1986 Amendment Act, no one can hold more 
than 20% of the quota for any Quota Management Area (QMA) and fish stock.  
 
The deemed value mechanism, also introduced in 2001, provides an incentive to 
balance catch against ACE. Deemed values are a financial penalty that fishers have to 
pay for the harvest that is not covered by ACE. Under the Fisheries Amendment Act 
1990, fishers pay a deemed value for the over-harvest not covered by ACE. Deemed 
values are usually set higher than the ACE price to discourage over-harvest; however 
a higher deemed value provides an incentive for dumping. Therefore, setting the 






3.  Literature Review 
 
 
The overall objectives of EBFM are to maintain the health of marine ecosystem and 
sustainable development of associated fisheries. According to Pikitch et al. (2004), 
the main purposes of EBFM are to: 
 
1.  Avoid degradation of the ecosystem, as assessed by environmental quality and 
ecosystem status. 
2.  Minimize irreversible risk related to species structure and ecosystem. 
3.  Produce long term socioeconomic benefits without compromising the 
ecosystem. 
4.  Develop and accumulate ecosystem knowledge that enables us to understand 
the potential consequence of human’s fishing activities. 
5.  Adopt a suitable precautionary management. 
 
Although the precautionary approach and EBFM have been widely discussed, there is 
very little literature about how these two ideas can operate together in fisheries 
management (Sanchirico et al. 2007). Both require ecologists and economists to 
consider constraints which represent system interactions and uncertainty. The 
standard approach to incorporate uncertainty relies on the risk neutrality of social 
planner. However, based on the Reed (1974, 1979) model, the optimal solution under 
single-species case is to shut down the fishery entirely for a certain period and re-open 
it after the ecosystem has re-covered to provide new harvestable stocks. This policy 
violates the goal that renewable marine resources should generate a sustainable flow 
of profits to fishers. Unnecessary closure would reduce fishers’ welfare. The standard 
approach which can deal with species interactions is to build structural models that 
determine the TAC for each harvestable species within the ecosystem. However, this 
kind of model is data intensive and costly to develop. Moreover, the optimal solution 




When regulations are species-specific and the species is part of a multi-species fishery, 
the production function will join species. According to Kirkley and Strand (1988), 
significant economic linkages and technology interactions co-exist in multi-species 
fisheries; separability of inputs factors and output among species is not plausible. 
Management focused on individual species cannot prevent over-harvesting and avoid 
economic waste. Thus, in order to implement a multi-species approach, we must 
understand the various components within an ecosystem, and consider their impacts in 
the ecosystem.  
 
There are three sorts of risk associated with fisheries management: availability of fish 
and therefore catch, changes of market price, and regulations (Pontecorvo, 1986). 
Biological assets, such as fish species, are not manufactured by humans, and therefore 
uncontrollable by human activity. The population of fish stocks fluctuate naturally 
due to shifting ocean-atmosphere phenomenon such as El Niňo – Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) which impact the survival of larval and juvenile fish, abiotic factors which 
affect recruitment (Myers, 1998; Rothschild, 2000), and trophic interaction such as 
predation (Bailey and Houds, 1989; Rice et al., 1993). Furthermore, fishing activity 
affects species composition and biomass structure. These factors make the availability 
of fish stocks highly unpredictable.  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop new techniques that incorporate risk assessment 
by calculating possible consequences of different combinations of management 
measures and data treatment so that we can evaluate how much improvement can be 
achieved relative to the traditional approach.  
 
 
Quota Management System 
 
After the introduction of QMS in New Zealand, the quota ownership structure 
changed rapidly (Falloon, 1993). Between 1986 and 1988, 15,580 quota covering 
453,000 tonnes were sold, and 3,417 quotas covers 253,000 tonnes were leased 
(Sissenwine and Mace, 1992). The sum of these quota transactions is much greater 
than the total amount of quota allocated in these years. This result indicates that some  
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quota must have been either sold or leased many times. The industry consolidation 
during the first three years (Bess, 2000) presumably leads to a more efficient fishery 
with the removal of less competent operators (Sissenwine & Mace, 1992).  
 
Before the introduction of the QMS, it was argued that small companies are not 
capable of competing with large firms and will be forced out of fishery, and this will 
lead to concentration in the industry. Connor (2000 and 2000b) found that quota 
ownership rapidly concentrated in the first several years. This aggregation tapered off 
in later years. Connor’s finding was supported later by Newell and Sanchirico (2003). 
Newell and Sanchirico (2003) not only investigated the concentration of quota rights 
ownership, but also examined the changing structure of fishery to find that it is the 
medium size of companies, rather than small companies, that exited the industry.  
 
 
Portfolio Approach  
 
It is observed that the expected returns along the efficient frontier increases at a 
decreasing rate. This implies that the one additional unit of aggregate return can be 
achieved by sacrificing more units of obtained variance after the point of unitary 
elasticity
7. Therefore, in the analysis of multi-species fisheries management, it is 
plausible to decrease the proportion of species that contribute more to return 
variability after considering their contribution to expected returns and interaction with 
other species. For example, predator species on the top of food web tend to live longer 
and their population normally remain stable (Beddington et al. 1984). Moreover, 
consumers generally place high value on these upper trophic level fish. These 
complementary characteristics illustrate that the low natural mortality species will 
count for more importance in a portfolio.  
 
There are two advantages of portfolio approach which make it more suited to be used 
in ecosystem-based management. One difficulty in applying the EBFM is that risk-
                                                 
7 Elasticity is the ratio of the proportional change in one variable with respect to proportional change in 
another variable. In economics, unitary elasticity refers to the situation where a change in one variable 
causes an equal or proportional change in another variable. So, unitary elasticity is equal to one in 
absolute value.  
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return trade-offs are inevitable (Sanchirico et al. 2007), and there is little guidance on 
how these trade-offs are to be set and compared (Sanchirico and Hanna 2004). The 
portfolio approach provides an empirical basis for evaluating tradeoffs. Another 
advantage is that it is possible to incorporate additional constraints into the objective 
function to achieve different ecological, economic, and social objectives.  
 
Several characteristics of multi-species fisheries should be considered when we apply 
portfolio model in the real world. First, it is usual for gear to harvest more than one 
fish species. According to Kelleher (2005), each year 8% of all harvested fish are 
thrown overboard and wasted. Bycatch is impossible to eliminate completely due to 
the co-existence of species in nature and unspecified technology (Berger et al, 1989). 
Managing the multi-species fisheries without considering bycatch can result in severe 
ecological and economic problems.  
 
Second, the value of a stock can be affected by more than one factor. The traditional 
method is to use biomass or age-class (cohort). However, gender ratios or population 
genetics can also contribute to the value of a stock (Cheung, 1970). Species habitat 
characteristics are another important factor which influences the stock valuation and 
fishing technology can change the habitats in beneficial or deleterious ways (Edwards 
et al. 2004). Altogether, these attributes complicate the evaluation of fish stocks 
within an ecosystem.  
 
Third, market price is another crucial element when considering the economic value 
of a fish stock. In multi-species fisheries, different species are usually treated as 
partial substitutes by consumers and seafood producers. Therefore, market price of 
one species is a function of not only itself, but also other species in this ecosystem. 
New Zealand imports seafood from overseas markets and exports most of its harvest 
to the world (Lock and Leslie, 2007). Due to the relatively small size of the domestic 
market and production capacity, international market prices inevitably have a strong 
influence on domestic markets. 
 
Finally, McGlade (1989) suggested that within a portfolio framework, property rights 
institutions should evaluate fish assets in the ecosystem and resolve conflicts among 
stakeholders on an ecosystem scale. Property rights, by definition, are the entitlements  
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of holders for the usage of resources which are accepted by society and protected 
against encroachment by others (Demsetz, 1998). In fisheries management, property 
right institutions define the relationship between fishers and fish stock in an 
ecosystem. With adequate property rights, regulators can prevent over-harvest and 
conserve fish stocks within an ecosystem. On the other hand, environmental 
uncertainties and stock fluctuations in an ecosystem also require the regulations to be 
flexible and adaptive to the variance of fisheries. Under this situation, collecting new 
information from the ecosystem is essential for regulators to make prompt decisions 
to meet the requirement of shifting multi-species fisheries.   
 
According to Elton and Gruber (1995), average risk of a combination of assets is 
totally different with risk of an individual asset. Therefore, there is a potential 
advantage of risk reduction in multi-species management if the value of assets in a 
portfolio move in different directions. In single species MSY analysis, the most 
obvious concern is the tradeoff between mean and variance of returns (Beddington 
and May, 1977; May et al., 1978; Silver, 1982). But in multi-species management 
analysis, the critical point is the covariance among different species (Edwards et al. 






The idea of applying the portfolio approach to multi-species fisheries management is 
novel, and few papers provide insights about this approach. Four prominent papers are 
presented below.  
 
3.1.  Arnason (2000) 
 
Arnason was probably the first economist to study the management of multi-species 
fisheries within the context of ecosystem. In 2000, he proposed an economic model in 
which manages fishing activities are managed so as to maximize economic yield. In 
his paper, an aggregate ecosystem fisheries model was developed. His model focused  
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on aggregate representations of an ecosystem. A habitat variable was used to 
influence the growth of fish biomass. Harvest is expressed as a function of biomass 
and fishing effort which in turn determines harvesting costs. The objective was to 
maximise the present value of economic rents from the fisheries.  
 
Two distinct results are found. First, it may be optimal that certain fisheries have zero 
or negative profits in order to increase the aggregate economic contribution from the 
ecosystem. Second, it is necessary to modify single species harvesting rules for 
certain species even though the species do not reveal biological interactions. Arnason 
reckoned that ecosystem fisheries are extremely complicated, and consequently very 
difficult to determine and implement optimal management rules. He recommended 
that ITQ approach rights are a promising option for ecosystem fisheries management 
because the fishery will operate efficiently subject to TACs under this system.  
 
 
3.2.  Edwards et al. (2004) 
 
In this paper, fish stocks are treated as environmental capital that yields permanent 
benefits to society. Therefore, the economic value of a renewable nature resource is 
the present value of net returns (revenues minus costs). More specifically, the 
economic value of a fish stock i in the current period (t = 0) is the accumulation of 
future income from harvest which is discounted by a rate ρ.  
 
Edwards et al. (2000) use technology H, an exogenous variable. The resulting revenue 
function of the jth unspecialized technology is  
 
                vj,t = ∑ t i t i t y y p , , ) (  − c(yi,t, … , yi,t, …, yn,t, x1,t, …, xi,t, … , xn,t׀Hj),  
 
which is subject to the appropriate growth rate equation  
 
                                            
dt
dx t i,
= g(x1,t, … , xi,t, … xn,t) − yi,t. 
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Based on the analysis of Elton and Gruber (1995), the expected value of the 
portfolio’s  return is: 
 
                                               E(Rt
P) =  ] ) ( [ , , ∑ ∫ df R R f h t i t i i  ,  
 
where f(Ri,t) is the relative frequency on the distribution of returns of stocks i; hi is the 
fraction of the portfolio’s aggregate return comprised by stock i. The variance of the 
portfolio is:           





t i i h σ + t ik k i h h ,
2 2 σ ∑∑ , 
 
where σik,t is the covariance of returns between assets i and k. The covariance can be 
decomposed as ρkj,tσi,tσi,t, where ρik,t is the correlation coefficient between asset i and k, 
σi,t and σi,t are standard deviations of asset i and k respectively.  
 
Edwards et al. (2000) apply this model to an ecosystem with three species. These 
species are linked by a trophic chain. One species is the prey species, and the other 
two are predators. The harvested fish are sold in a competitive market where the 
species are treated as partial substitutes. Thus the trophic interaction and price 
relations results in correlation among species. All possible stock portfolios are 
calculated and plotted as a set of points in a two-dimensional expected return and 
variable space. Accordingly, a risk-return efficient frontier is presented with minimum 
variance or maximum expected returns along the outer envelope.  
 
Since the expected return along the efficient frontier increases at a decreasing rate, the 
gain in the expected value of total returns is less than the increase in variance after the 
point of unitary elasticity. Therefore, it may be profitable to thin out the stocks that 
contribute the most to return variability. That is, given well-defined objectives and 
ecological and economic constraints, populations of low-value or high-risk species 
can be deleted from the portfolio in order to balance the expected return against return 
variability. On this basis, the portfolio manager would be expected to manage fewer 
species than are currently exploited. This paper also emphasised the necessity of 
property rights in multi-species fishery management.  
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3.3.  Perruso et al. (2005) 
 
A significant aspect of this model is that spatial decision making provides important 
information to firm managers for optimal firm behaviour. Thus, a linkage between the 
ex ante production level and spatial decision-making is presented. More specifically, 
the optimal targeting portfolio approach is based on a pelagic longline vessel 
operating on the trip level.  
 
A theory of a fisher’s behaviour is considered in this model. The fisher selects the 
catch of species that generates the maximised expected utility by evaluating different 
affordable harvest choices within a portfolio. This implies that there is a probability 
distribution of the portfolio’s net return. It is assumed that the fisher’s initial wealth is 
zero so that ex ante targeting decision will not be affected by existing wealth. Since 
the targeting decision is made at the trip level, net trip level return will explain a 
fisher’s behaviour.  
 
If the expected utility function is assumed to be monotonic and strictly concave, then 
a preference for expected returns and an aversion to variance in returns is guaranteed. 
The analysis above indicated that expected utility is a function of the mean, variance 
and skewness of net revenues and risk is due to production uncertainty.  
 
The portfolio targeting model considered the optimal targeting strategy by allocating 
effort (trip) toward a set of harvestable species based on a trade-off between expected 
returns and variance of returns. The optimal targeting problem is to minimize the 
variance of trip level revenue subject to constraints that the expected value of trip 
level return is greater than a specified level return β. Changing the value of β in the 
quadratic function yields an efficient frontier of harvest strategies. Each point on the 
efficient frontier minimizes the variance of trip level revenue given a specified level 
of returns.  
 
Perruso et al. suggest that the portfolio approach is a valuable tool for individual firm 
managers when choosing targeting strategies and modifying their policy in 
accordance with government requirements. However, to be more practical, this  
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portfolio model may need to incorporate more information to make long-run decisions, 
such as species-specific regulations in certain fisheries.  
 
 
3.4.  Sanchirico et al. (2006) 
 
A value-at-risk method is adopted in their model, and fish prices are assumed to be 
constant in seafood market. The target strategy is to find the optimal weight of 
revenue for each species which represents the percentage of mean revenue of a 
particular species contribute to the portfolio. Total expected revenue is the weighted 
average of revenues from each species.  
 
Revenues of certain species are correlated. The optimization problem is to minimize 
the variance of total profit. The target function is subject to a constraint that the 
expected value of total revenue is greater than target level of revenue which is 
determined by the firm manager’s willingness to accept risk.  
 
Sustainability constraints are also imposed in their model which restricts the revenue 
weight to a certain range. First, the non-negative value of revenue weights ensures 
that each weight is feasible. Second, the ecosystem has limited physical capacity to 
generate revenue, the upper limits of each weight ensures that catch does not exceed 
the current fish stock or allowable fraction of harvest. The upper bound of constraint 
is set according to rule that the ex post catch levels will not exceed the ex ante 
sustainable levels and consequently a precautionary safeguard applies. In their study, 
the sustainability parameter was treated as exogenous by ecosystem managers who 
choose the optimal catch of species to meet the target revenue and subject to the 
sustainability parameter.  
 
By using the full covariance matrix, ecosystem frontiers for 1980, 1990, and 2000 
were presented. A single species frontier was also derived by ignoring species 
interactions. Putting these two frontiers in one graph, they found that the frontiers do 
not overlap with each other which imply that the species’ correlations do play an 
important role in the ecosystem. Moreover, by allocating data into different periods, 
they found that the full covariance frontier lies above the diagonal covariance frontier  
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in all graph, indicating that - given target revenue - the ecosystem approach causes 
less risk than the single species approach due to the potential negative correlation of 




































The primary aim of this research is to find the optimal harvest level of different fish 
species in static state for a specific fishing firm by using the portfolio approach. To 
conduct this research, several objectives are listed below: 
 
1.  Two economic models will be derived. The first model will investigate the 
optimal harvest when the TACC is a binding constraint for fishing firm; the 
second model will relax this constraint. 
2.  These models will be applied to a firm governed under New Zealand QMS to 
generate efficient frontiers.  
3.  I will examine the optimal results, and compare it with actual data to give 
possible policy suggestions for both the firm and Ministry. 
 
By adopting the portfolio approach, the manager can choose the optimal catch level of 
each fish species subject to ecosystem sustainability and capability. A point on the 
efficient frontier represents an optimal harvest for each species within this portfolio. 
Fishing firms can use the portfolio approach to choose the species and quantities so as 
to mitigate potential risk associated with harvest. By operating on the frontier, firm 
managers ensure that they are gaining the most revenue for a given level of risk 





This research adopts the firm manager’s point of view for the maximization of total 
profit. It has been argued that profit may not be the best measure to evaluate the value 
of an ecosystem. Ecosystem stability or social welfare (trophic-level contributions to 
economic value) can be alternative objectives. However, the time-series data of these 
two targets are not complete or not available. It is commonly accepted that the most  
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suitable economic model is determined by the availability of data (Turvey 1964; 
Hilborn & Mangel 1997). Since the approach in this research is empirical, results will 
depend on the availability of data. Therefore, targeting profit will provide a better 
metric to measure the trade-off between the expected value and variability in fishery 
revenues.  
 
Profit data not only indicate the performance of firms during fishing season which 
includes employment and efficiency of fishing activities, but also other important 
information, e.g. fish stock size. On the other hand, the variance of profit is expensive 
to the individual fisher. They have limited ability to earn income outside of fisheries 
but have considerable expenditure to cover. Varying revenue cannot guarantee 
constant income for fishers; it will degrade their living standard and deteriorate 
viability of fisheries. Variance of revenue also send misleading signal to capital 
investment and increase the risk of returning. Therefore, maximising the expected 
value of profit or minimising the variance of profit will be the target function in this 
research.  
 
Three methods can be used for portfolio analysis: 
 
1.  Graphical method; 
2.  Calculus method; 
3.  Quadratic programming (QP). 
 
The principal advantage of graphical methods is that it is easier to grasp conceptually. 
The disadvantage of it is that it cannot handle portfolios containing more than a few 
stocks. The calculus method is capable to handle portfolios containing large number 
of securities. Also, it is simple to manipulate. However, the calculus solution 
technique cannot handle inequality constraints. Quadratic programming (QP) is the 
most useful method in handling large portfolio problems that involves inequality 
constraints. With this method, each security or asset in a portfolio can be determined 




1.  Efficient Production. Maximization of profit with linear production functions 
and linear marginal cost. 
2.  Convex programming. Minimization of a convex function subject to linear 
constrains. 
3.  Regression. Finding the best least-square fit to given data. 
4.  Portfolio Analysis. Choosing a combination of random variables given 
expected value and variance. 
 
For a portfolio which consist a set of n assets, the data inputs are: 
  
1.  n expected returns. 
2.  n variances of returns. 
3.  (n
2 – n)/2 covariance. 
 
Applying portfolio approach into fisheries is rare and new to economists. There is risk 
that profit may vary over a certain range. The harvesting profit cannot be guaranteed 
with 100 percentages. The firm manager has to bear the risk that in a year the total 
profit may vary. If the manager wants to reach a certain point of total profit, he or she 
has to bear a risk that with certain probability the profit may not reach that point. 
Then we can draw an efficient frontier in a return-risk quadrant. On the frontier, a 
certain point of expected value of profit corresponds to a certain point of variance 
which represents the risk. Moreover, a point on the efficient frontier represents a 
portfolio, which consists of harvests of different species. Given a manager's risk-
aversion ratio, locating the efficient frontier is possible. Points on that frontier mean 
that what's the maximum profit the manager can obtain given a certain level of risk 
(variance in this situation).  
 
There are many factors that affect the variance of profit. A large proportion of New 
Zealand’s harvest is exported, e.g. Japan, Europe, or North America
8. New Zealand is 
a small country and takes world price as given. Foreign markets usually influences 
local sea product price, resulting in the local price unpredictable. The harvesting cost 
also reflects information about the fishery, for example, advance within fishing 
                                                 
8 According to Ministry of Fisheries, 90% of total harvests are exported to foreign markets.   
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technology, employment, oil price, or administration regulation, such as, restriction of 
fishing season, exclusion of fishing area, and so on. Marine system influence fish 
stocks. Fish population is often affected by predation, disease, or competition from 
other species. Marine currents, temperature oscillation, abundance of nutrition also 
change fish stock. All these environmental forces influence stock size, directly or 
indirectly influence catches levels and corresponding profits of fisheries. Due to the 
limitation of knowledge about the marine forces and stock sizes, it is extremely 
difficult to examine how these marine forces, fishing technology, regulations and 
market conditions affect the fisheries profits.  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to find a variable that contains all the information. In this 
research, the ACE price which is determined by market price and harvesting cost is 
the appropriate variable that will be used to analysis fisheries profits. ACE price 
reflects the net return of unit harvest. The uncertainty of profit is represented by the 
fluctuation of ACE price. The varying ACE price reflects the changes of both market 
conditions and biological information.  
 
From Francis and Archer (1979), the general formulation for calculating 
maximization of a portfolio’s return is  
  
                                                V = θ E(rp) – var(rp) ,                                             (5.1) 
 
where rp represents portfolio’s return, it is the summation of every species’s return in 
the portfolio; θ is the weight attached to a unit of expected return relative to a unit of 
variance. It is a positive constant and increasing with increased expected return. θ 
represents the firm manager’s risk-aversion attitude to risk. Higher value of θ means 
the portfolio manager has more aggressive attitude. It is shown in Figure 6.   
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                              Figure 6. Efficient Frontier of Portfolio as θ varies 
 
There are two main advantages of adopting portfolio theory compared with traditional 
optimization theory. First, traditional optimization only considers a single return from 
separate term while ignoring the correlations among terms. Portfolio theory 
incorporates the correlations and calculates the overall return from all terms. Second, 
the portfolio approach transforms the objective function from a linear profit function 
to a quadratic portfolio return function. With a linear objective function, the optimal 
results are generated by just choosing the bounded value of a choice variable in the 
constraint range; however, with the quadratic objective function, the optimal result 
will be selected carefully within the constrain range.  
 
 
4.3. Model with Binding Constraint 
 
For a firm manager, the choice variable is the catch level of species the firm is 
harvesting. By choosing the optimal harvest for each species, the firm manager aims 
at maximising the total profit of fisheries subject to its endowments of TACC.  
 
4.3.1. Profit of fisheries 
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Suppose there are n species harvested in New Zealand fisheries.  
 
Let qi denote the harvest of species i. Then profit from harvesting species i is  
 
                                                         πi = (pi – ci) · qi, 
 
where pi denotes the landing price of species, ci denotes the harvest cost of species i. 
 
Let Ai denotes the ACE of species i, then  
 
                                                              πi = Ai · qi,  
 
since the ACE price is determined by considering both landing price and harvest cost, 
it reflects the unit return of harvest. 
 
Therefore, for the New Zealand fisheries, the total profit from harvesting all fish 
species is  















Let Āi denotes the expected value of ACE price Ai, i.e. 
 
                                                             E(Ai) = Āi. 
 
Thus the expected value of total profit is  
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.                           (5.2) 
 
Let σi
2 denotes the variance of Ai, σij denotes the covariance between ACE price Ai 
and Aj, i.e. 
                                                         Var(Ai) = σi
2, 
                                                       Cov(Ai, Aj) = σij. 
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Then variance of the total profit is 
 
                                   Var(П) = E [ П – E(П) ]
2 





j iq q σ ∑∑
== 11
.
9                                                   (5.3) 
 
Substituting (5.2) and (5.3) into the (5.1), the total harvesting return of fisheries with 
portfolio theory is  
 
                                     V = θ · E(П) – var(П) 
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.                                       (5.4) 
 
Then the objective function is  
 
                                   
qj qi Max
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The choice variable qi is subjected to the bound conditions 
 
                                                      0 ≤ qi ≤ TACCi. 
 
Given the TACC rights a fishing firm own for different species, the optimal results is 
only for this specific firm. It is noted that this model is suitable for any fishing firm in 
New Zealand fishery as long as TACC rights that a firm owns are given.  
 
 
4.3.2. Feasibility of Model 
 
                                                 
9 For further derivation, please refer to appendix 1.  
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, then the transpose matrix of a, which is denoted by aʹ, is  
          aʹ = (Ā1, Ā2, … , Ān). 
 



















, then the transpose matrix of  c, which is denoted by cʹ, is  
          cʹ = (q1, q2, … , qn).  
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Then the objective function is transformed into  
 
                                              Max U = Max {θ lʹc – cʹDc},                                 (5.5) 
 
which subject to the bounded conditions  
 
                                                        0 ≤ c ≤ b,                                                        (5.6) 
 
where D is a symmetric definite (n, n) matrix; c and b are n-column vectors.  
 
This is a typical quadratic programming problem which involves maximizing a 
quadratic objective function (5.5) subject to linear inequalities (5.6).   
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There are a large number of papers about the quadratic optimisation problem since H. 
W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker first investigated the stationary points in quadratic 
objective function subject to linear inequalities (Kuhn Tucker, 1951). Kuhn and 
Tucker formulated both the sufficient and necessary conditions for a saddle value of 
any differentiable function and applied them through a Lagrangian to find a maximum 
for a new differentiable function constrained by inequalities. Afterwards, many well-
known procedures are available for solving the maximum problem in the concave 
case, e.g. Wolfe (1959) and Zoutendijk (1960). If the objective function is non-
concave, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are only necessary, the application of their 
method generally leads to only a stationary point which can be either a saddle point or 
a  relative extremum. Orden(1963) provided both the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the optimal solution of the non-concave quadratic maximum problem if 
the constraints are linear equations. Later, Ritter (1966) investigated the maximization 
of a non-concave quadratic objective function with linear inequalities as constraints.  
Zwart presented an algorithm for the global maximization of a convex function 
subjective to linear inequality constrains (1969), he argued that Ritter’s method lacks 
of convergence and possibly gives rise to cycling. Zwart proposed a computationally 
finite algorithm and it was designed to converge rapidly since there are few local 
optima or the global optimum if significantly better than other local optima.  In this 
research, the most suitable reference for the objective function is Frank & Wolfe’s 
paper which published in 1956. 
 
All approaches are computationally demanding. Currently, the most commonly used 
software for solving the quadratic optimization problems is CPLEX. Therefore, to 
obtain the optimal solutions, learning how to manipulate the CPLEX skilfully, or 
specifically, how to write computer code correctly is critical in the following research.  
 
The efficient frontier can be derived by varying the value of risk-aversion attitude 
coefficient θ. By solving the model (5.5), the optimal qi* will be obtained which 
contains value of θ. Choosing a specific value of θ will generate a value for qi*. Given 
the value of qi*, the expected value of portfolio return can be calculated by 
multiplying the corresponding expected value of corresponding ACE price of species. 
The portfolio’s variance can also be calculated given the variance of species’ ACE 
prices. Then a point on a return-variance quadrant will be determined. Changing the  
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value of θ and following the same procedure, a set of optimal points will be attained. 
Combining these points will generate an efficient frontier which representing the 
optimal choice for firm manager.  
 
 
4.4. Model Without Binding Constraint 
 
Due to introduction of ACE and deemed value, fishers can harvest more than their 
entitlement. Fishers can either buy extra ACE rights from the quota market or pay 
deemed value to the government to cover their excess harvest. This implies fishers 
can harvest at any level they wish. In this situation, the TACC is not a binding 
constraint for fishing firm. This section investigates the optimal harvest without a 
TACC constraint.  
 
Let Ai denotes the ACE price of species i, let DVi denotes the deemed value of species 
i. Due to the limits of available amount of ACE, there is no guarantee that this firm 
can purchase enough ACE from market to cover its harvest over its original TACC 
endowment. Therefore, there is probability that this firm has to pay deemed value to 
cover its over-harvests. Based on the firm’s previous records, it is possible to 
calculate the probability that this firm was able to purchase ACE, and the rest of the 
probability is the percentage that this firm has to pay deemed value.  
 
Let α denotes the percentage that this firm can get the ACE, then we can get 
 
                                                α Ai + (1 – α) DVi = Ti                                            (5.7) 
 
where Ti represents the unit cost that this firm has to pay for an additional quantity of 
over-harvest of species i. 
 
It is assumed that past data can be used to explain future behaviour. The New Zealand 
QMS has been functioning well in recent years. The equilibrium value of ACE price 
does not change dramatically year to year. Therefore, we can assume that previous 
period expected value of ACE price can be used as current period expected value of  
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ACE price. To obtain optimal harvests for current fishing season, the ACE price and 
deemed value in equation (5.7) will use previous periods expected value of ACE price 
and deemed value.  
 
Let Hi denotes the harvest of this firm. Thus  
 
                                                      Hi = TACCi + qi  
 
where qi denotes the over-harvest quantity of species i.  
 
The purpose of this model is to find the optimal harvest of this firm. Since the TACCi 
is given at the beginning of this fishing season, it is an exogenous variable, so finding 
the optimal over-harvest qi is equivalent to finding the optimal Hi in this model. 
 
The profit of harvesting species i is  
 
                  πi = pi · Hi – ci · Hi – Ti · qi 
                      = pi · (TACCi + qi) – ci · (TACCi + qi) – Ti · qi 
                      = (pi – ci) · (TACCi +  qi) – Ti · qi 
                      = Ai ·( TACCi  + qi) – Ti · qi 
                       
Let Π denotes the total profit of harvest over all species, then  
 







                      = A1 · (TACC1 + q1) – T1 · q1 + … + An ·(TACCn  + qn) – Tn · qn. 
 
Let  Āi denotes the expected value of Ai,  i T denotes the expected value of Ti, the 
expected value of total profit is  
 
        E(Π) = E[A1 (TACC1  + q1) – T1 · q1 + … + An · (TACCn  + qn) – Tn · qn] 
                 = E(A1) (TACC1  + q1) – E(T1) · q1 + … + E(An) · (TACCn  + qn) – E(Tn) · qn 
                 = Ā1 (TACC1 + q1) –  1 T  · q1 + … + Ān · (TACCn + qn) –  n T  · qn  
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                 = Ā1 TACC1 + (Ā1 – 1 T ) · q1 + … + Ān TACCn + (Ān – n T ) · qn 
                 = (Ā1 TACC1 + … + Ān TACCn) + (Ā1 – 1 T ) · q1 + … + (Ān – n T ) · qn 
                 = C + (Ā1 – 1 T ) · q1 + … + (Ān – n T ) · qn,        since Āi and TACCi are given. 
 
The variance of harvesting return is  
 
 Var(П) = E [ П – E(П) ]
2 
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where σij denotes the covariance between Ai and Aj, νij denotes the covariance between 
Ti and Tj, ωij denotes the covariance between Ai and Ti.  
 
The resulting quadratic programming problem is to minimize the variance of total 
return V subjective to a specified level of total return B, non-negative harvest of each 
species, and ecosystem capability: 
 
               
qj qi Minimise
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1
) ( ≥ B – C, and 0 ≤ qi ≤ Ri  – TACCi,  
 
where Ri denotes the total biomass of species i in New Zealand marine system.  
 
Varying the value of B in repeated optimizations generates an efficient frontier of 
harvest strategies. The firm manager’s risk tolerance determines the value of B. A 
risk-averse manager would choose a high value of B. A manager who is confident 
about the future performance of firm would accept a low value of B. 
 
                                                 
10 For further derivation, please refer to appendix 1.  
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4.5. Data  
 
In both models, data for four exogenous variables are needed for the analysis: TACC, 
ACE price, deemed value, and total biomass of each species. 
 
ACE price data are available from Ministry of Fisheries (MFish). Data of ACE prices 
are routinely collected by MFish officers and fishing firm managers. Observing the 
ACE prices of each species will enable us to understand the varying trend in recent 
fishing years which contain both market and biological information.  
 
Firm’s share of TACC will also be collected. The data indicate the TACC endowment 
this firm own in this fishing year.  
 
Transactions of ACE and deemed value payment will be collected from the firm’s 
records. With these data, the unit cost of over-harvest in (5.7) will be calculated.  
 
In New Zealand fisheries, the biomass level of each species is estimated in a certain 
range by using a specific biological method. The maximum level of biomass will be 
used in this research. The data range is available in MFish.  
 
Given the data set describe above, several tasks can be conducted: 
 
1.  Given a data set of ACE prices, a covariance table will be calculated among 
different species. This table will indicate species with correlation. Possible 
explanations about these phenomena will be given by considering market 
information (e.g. substitution goods) or trophic level (e.g. predator-prey 
competition); and the intuitions that can be obtained from these results. 
Moreover, with the data set, it is possible to see whether some species can be 
reasonably omitted from the analysis.  
 
2.  An ecosystem mean-variance frontier will be derived by changing the value of 
risk-aversion attitude coefficient θ. Given specific value of θ, for example, low 
value (θ = 1), medium value (θ = 50), or high value (θ = 1000), quantities or  
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shares of each species will be obtained. Consequently, the manager can 
manipulate the share of harvests of each species to generate the maximized 
profit based on his or her attitude to risk. Tables of Share of harvests with 
different value θ will be presented.  
 
3.  The ecosystem frontier above is derived by using the full covariance matrix 
which representing the correlation between different species. If only the 
diagonal-only covariance matrix is applied, then this strategy implies that only 
individual species variability are considered, species interactions are ignored. 
This ecosystem frontier will also be presented.  
 
4.  Comparing these two frontiers provides insight into the species correlation in 
New Zealand ecosystem. Theoretically, either frontier could have higher level 
revenue given a level of risk (variance). The relative position depends on the 
signs and magnitude of covariance among fish species. For example, in a two 
fish stock portfolio, if these two species are negatively correlated, then the 
frontier with full covariance matrix will have higher return or lower variance 
comparing with frontier with diagonal-only covariance matrix. In an n species 
portfolio, the relative frontier depends on the actual covariance of all fish 
stocks in the portfolio. This method will answer the question: whether the 
biological and economic interdependence should be taken into account to gain 
potential opportunity in the New Zealand ecosystem.  
 
5.  Actual return-variance points will also be plotted in the efficient frontier 
diagram. The distance between actual point and optimal point will be 
calculated in percentage terms. This will indicate how much improvement can 
be made. It is recommended that the distance can be used as ecosystem-based 
indicators (Brodziak & Link, 2002) so that knowledge of whether the 
ecosystem is over-harvested, fully invested, or under-harvested can be 
accumulated.  
 
6.  Given the optimal harvest of each species, share of species within a portfolio 
can be calculated. Since the correlations among different species are different, 
some species have zero correlation; it is plausible to eliminate certain species  
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which have little correlations with other species to investigate the variation of 
shares of species in the portfolio. For example, biologically, red rock lobster 
has low correlation with other species. This research will consider deleting this 
species in the portfolio to examine the share of other species and then compare 
those shares in the portfolio in which red rock lobster is included. Risk-
aversion coefficient θ will be selected with specific value to calculate the share 
of species (e.g. θ = 100).  
 
 
4.6. Species selection 
 
There are 97 marine species and species complexes in New Zealand’s QMS. 
Including all species into this research is impractical. Perruso et al.’s paper analysed 8 
species; Sanchirico and Smith chose 22 species in their research to examine these 
species’ correlation and appropriate weight. Because the number and type of species 
the firm harvests are unknown at this stage, the firm is presumably harvesting some of 
the 97 species. 
 
There are two criteria for the species selection. The first one is the commercial value 
of species. Hoki, spiny red rock lobster, black paua& yellowfoot paua, arrow squid, 
orange roughy, snapper, ling, hake, scampi, and tarakihi are the top 10 most 
profitable species in New Zealand. They contribute 78.7% of total commercial value 
in 2006
11. These ten most significant species will be included in this research. The 
second criterion for species selection is the availability of data. In this research, there 
are market and biological variables that require data to conduct econometric analysis.  
Species that lacks of these data will be absent in my research.  
 
Therefore, based on these two criteria, 30 species will be considered. Appendix 2 is 
the list of potential species that will be analysed in this research. 
 
 
4.7. Future work 
                                                 
11 Data can be collected from Ministry of Fisheries website.  
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In financial market, risk-free asset exists. Asset-holders do not bear any risk for 
holding these types of assets. N.Z. Government Treasury Bill is one of example even 
it offers lower return than marketable stocks. In New Zealand fisheries, each fishing 
firm has an endowment of harvesting quota at the beginning of fishing season. The 
quota is tradable in market. Owners of quota can sell the harvesting right to other 
firms to gain certain returns. If we assume that the quota-holder can always find a 
buyer of ACE from the market, then the ACE return can be guaranteed all the time 
and then annual ACE return can be considered as a risk-free return in fisheries market. 




                      Figure 7.  Combing Risky portfolio with a risk-free asset 
 
Under this circumstance, the portfolio efficient frontier will be changed from that 
curve to the tangent line which I call the Fisheries Market Line (FML) corresponding 
to Capital Market Line (CML) in financial market. I will define and locate this 




4.8.  Policy Suggestions 
 
If the optimal results obtained from this research differ from the actual data, then the 
difference has to be explained so that valuable suggestions can be made to firm 
managers and/or fishery administrators. For example, if the firm manager adopts the 
first model and find that the quota rights the fishing firm holds are larger than the 
optimal results, then the manager can sell or lease redundant quota rights in the 
portfolio. If the optimal results are greater than the fishing firm’s quota endowments, 
then is there any reason why this firm does not hold enough quota rights? Is there any 
regulation barrier that imposed on the firm preventing it acquire more quotas? Or does 
this firm itself have any disadvantage within its structure restricting it doing so? These 
questions will be investigated in further once the optimization models have been run 
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Variance of profit with binding constraint: 
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Variance of profit without binding constraint: 
 
Var(Π) = E(Π – E(Π))
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– E[A1(TACC1 + q1) – T1q1 + … + An(TACCn + qn) – Tnqn]}
2 
 
             = E{[A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1) + … + [An – E(An)]·(TACCn + qn)  
                      – [T1 – E(T1)]·q1 – … – [Tn – E(Tn)]·qn}
2 
 
             = E{[A1 – E(A1)]
2·(TACC1 + q1)
2 + … + [An – E(An)]
2·(TACCn + qn)
2 
                      + [T1 – E(T1)]
2·q1
2 + … + [Tn – E(Tn)]
2·qn
2 
                      + [A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1)·[A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2) 
                      + …  
                      + [A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1)·[An – E(An)]·(TACCn + qn) 
                      – [A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1)·[T1 – E(T1)]·q1 
                      – … 
                      – [A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1)·[Tn – E(Tn)]·qn 
 
                      + [A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2)·[A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1) 
                      + …  
                      + [A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2) ·[An – E(An)]·(TACCn + qn)  
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                      – [A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2)·[T1 – E(T1)]·q1 
                      – …  
                      – [A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2)·[Tn – E(Tn)]·qn 
                      + … } 
 
               = E{[A1 – E(A1)]
2·(TACC1 + q1)
2 + … + [An – E(An)]
2·(TACCn + qn)
2 
                      + [T1 – E(T1)]
2·q1
2 + … + [Tn – E(Tn)]
2·qn
2 
                      + 2[A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1)·[A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2) 
                      + …  
                      + 2[A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1)·[An – E(An)]·(TACCn + qn) 
                      + 2[A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2)·[A3 – E(A3)]·(TACC3 + q3) 
                      + … 
                      + 2[A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2)·[An – E(An)]·(TACCn + qn) 
                      + … 
                      + 2[An-1 – E(An-1)]·(TACCn-1 + qn-1)·[An – E(An)]·(TACCn + qn) 
                      + 2[T1 – E(T1)]·q1 [T2 – E(T2)]·q2  
                      + …  
                      + 2[T1 – E(T1)]·qn [Tn – E(Tn)]·qn 
                      + 2[T2 – E(T2)]·q2 [T3 – E(T3)]·q3 
                      + … 
                      + 2[T2 – E(T2)]·q2 [Tn – E(Tn)]·qn 
                      + … 
                      + 2[Tn-1 – E(Tn-1)]·qn-1 [Tn – E(Tn)]·qn 
– 2[A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1) [T1 – E(T1)]·q1 
– … 
– 2[A1 – E(A1)]·(TACC1 + q1) [Tn – E(Tn)]·qn 
– 2[A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2) [T1 – E(T1)]·q1 
– … 
– 2[A2 – E(A2)]·(TACC2 + q2) [Tn – E(Tn)]·qn 
– … 
– 2[An – E(An)]·(TACCn + qn) [T1 – E(T1)]·q1 
– … 
– 2[An – E(An)]·(TACCn + qn) [Tn – E(Tn)]·qn} 
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                  = E{[A1 – E(A1)]
2}·(TACC1 + q1)
2 + … + E{[An – E(An)]
2}·(TACCn + qn)
2 
                      + E{[T1 – E(T1)]
2}·q1




                      + 2 E{[A1 – E(A1)]·[A2 – E(A2)]}·(TACC1 + q1) (TACC2 + q2) 
                      + …  
                      + 2 E{[A1 – E(A1)]· [An – E(An)]}·(TACC1 + q1)(TACCn + qn) 
                      + 2 E{[A2 – E(A2)]·[A3 – E(A3)]}·(TACC2 + q2) (TACC3 + q3) 
                      + … 
                      + 2 E{[A2 – E(A2)]·[An – E(An)]}·(TACC2 + q2) (TACCn + qn) 
                      + … 
                      + 2 E{[An-1 – E(An-1)]·[An – E(An)]}·(TACCn-1 + qn-1) (TACCn + qn) 
 
                      + 2 E{[T1 – E(T1)]·[T2 – E(T2)]}·q1q2  
                      + …  
                      + 2 E{[T1 – E(T1)]·[Tn – E(Tn)]}· q1qn 
                      + 2 E{[T2 – E(T2)]·[T3 – E(T3)]}·q2q3 
                      + … 
                      + 2 E{[T2 – E(T2)]·[Tn – E(Tn)]}·q2qn 
                      + … 
                      + 2 E{[Tn-1 – E(Tn-1)]·[Tn – E(Tn)]}·qn-1 qn 
 
– 2 E{[A1 – E(A1)] [T1 – E(T1)]}·(TACC1 + q1)q1 
– … 
– 2E{[A1 – E(A1)]·[Tn – E(Tn)]}·(TACC1 + q1)qn 
– 2E{[A2 – E(A2)]·[T1 – E(T1)]}·(TACC2 + q2) q1 
– … 
– 2E{[A2 – E(A2)]·[Tn – E(Tn)]}·(TACC2 + q2)qn 
– … 
– 2E{[An – E(An)]·[T1 – E(T1)]}·(TACCn + qn) q1 
– … 
– 2E{[An – E(An)]·[Tn – E(Tn)]}·(TACCn + qn) qn 
 
                 = Var(A1)·(TACC1 + q1)
2 + … + Var(An)·(TACCn + qn)
2 
                      + Var(Tn)·q1
2 + … + Var(Tn)·qn
2  
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                      + 2 cov(A1, A2)·(TACC1 + q1) (TACC2 + q2) 
                      + …  
                      + 2 cov(A1, An)·(TACC1 + q1)(TACCn + qn) 
                      + 2 cov(A2, A3)·(TACC2 + q2) (TACC3 + q3) 
                      + … 
                      + 2 cov(A2, An)·(TACC2 + q2) (TACCn + qn) 
                      + … 
                      + 2 cov(An-1, An)·(TACCn-1 + qn-1) (TACCn + qn) 
 
                      + 2 cov(T1, T2)·q1q2  
                      + …  
                      + 2 cov(T1, Tn)· qn qn 
                      + 2 cov(T2, T3)·q2q3 
                      + … 
                      + 2 cov(T2, Tn)·q2qn 
                      + … 
                      + 2 cov(Tn-1, Tn)·qn-1 qn 
 
– 2 cov(A1, T1)·(TACC1 + q1)q1 
– … 
– 2cov(A1, Tn)·(TACC1 + q1)qn 
– 2cov(A2, T1)·(TACC2 + q2) q1 
– … 
– 2cov(A2, Tn)·(TACC2 + q2)qn 
– … 
– 2cov(An, T1)·(TACCn + qn) q1 
– … 
– 2cov(An, Tn)·(TACCn + qn) qn 
 







ij j j i i q TACC q TACC
11















ij j i i q q TACC
11
) ( ω , 
 
where σij denotes the covariance between Ai and Aj, νij denotes the covariance between 
Ti and Tj, ωij denotes the covariance between Ai and Ti.   
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Appendix 2 
                                                                  Species List 
 
1.  Hoki (HOK) 
2.  Red rock lobster (CRA) 
3.  Paua (PAU) 
4.  Arrow squid (SQU) 
5.  Orange roughy (ORH) 
6.  Snapper (SNA) 
7.  Ling (LIN) 
8.  Hake (HAK) 
9.  Scampi (SCI) 
10. Tarakihi (TAR) 
11. Alfonsino (BYX) 
12. Barracouta (BAR) 
13. Black cardinalfish (CDL) 
14. Blue cod (BCO) 
15. Blue moki (MOK) 
16. Blue shark (BWS) 
17. Blue warehou (WAR) 
18. Bluenose (BNS) 
19. Cockle (COC) 
20. Elephant fish (ELE) 
21. Flatfish (FLA) 
22. Gemfish (SKI) 
23. Grey mullet (GMU) 
24. Jack mackerel (JMA) 
25. John dory (JDO) 
26. Kahawai (KAH) 
27. Mako shark (MAK) 
28. Orange roughy (ORH) 
29. Oreo (black) (OEO (BOE)) 
30. Oreo (smooth) (OEO (SSO)) 